Vessel A departed at midnight. Once the pilot had left the vessel it increased its speed to 17 knots. Visibility was
about 3-4M with westerly wind force 3 and calm seas. There were a number of commercial vessels and fishing
vessels in the area.

The Second Officer was acting as OOW, assisted by a lookout. The vessel was on autopilot and both radars
were running. The S-band (10 cm) was primarily on three miles range, north-up with the centre offset to give a
better view ahead and the X-band radar (3 cm) mainly on six miles range.

The Master completed the night orders with his customary message and then left the bridge to get some rest. Before
leaving the bridge he observed fishing vessels to starboard in the distance and also some larger merchant vessels. His
assessment was that none posed any concern. Over the next 30 minutes the Second Officer altered the vessel’s heading on the autopilot several times. He began plotting Vessel B which was on the portside at a distance of about 10M. The ARPA data indicated that vessel B would pass astern.

There were also two merchant vessels on his starboard side crossing to port with a CPA of about 0.7M and 1.5M – these
were the Second Officer’s main focus. These were coupled with an unknown number of fishing vessels in the area
that seemed to be stationary. The Second Officer made a number of small alterations on the autopilot to port to stay clear of the fishing vessels.

When vessel B was about 4M away the Second Officer could see its lights. He didn’t take any visual bearing but
monitored it on the ARPA. Still unconcerned he focused his attention on the fishing vessels and merchant vessels on
the starboard side. He did not notice any change in the CPA for vessel B. It is the evidence of the Second Officer that at about seven minutes before the collision at 0355 he ordered the lookout to hand steer the vessel as close as possible to the fishing
vessels. He believed this would give him more room for vessel B. At this time the OOW was also handing over the
watch to the 4-8 Officer.

The Second Officer ordered starboard 10 and to steer 074 degrees. He was then concerned that this was too close
to the fishing vessels and ordered 070. At the same time vessel B’s bow collided with the port side of vessel A. The
angle between the vessels was about 90°. The Second Officer did not use any signals before the collision such as the whistle, aldis lamp or VHF. Vessel B did not use any warning signals either. About 10 minutes before the collision vessel B made an alteration 10° to port.

Read more about the consequences from the above, and the questions to this article:

MSS Case June: Collision in congested waters

Vessel A departed at midnight. Once the pilot had left the vessel it increased its speed to 17 knots. Visibility was about 3-4M with westerly wind force 3 and calm seas. There were a number of commercial vessels and fishing vessels in the area.

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For more Loss Prevention information, please contact: 
Joakim Enström, Loss Prevention Officer
E-mail: joakim.enstrom@swedishclub.com

Each month, the Club’s Loss Prevention team issues a new safety scenario to assist members in their efforts to comply with international safety regulations and follow best practices.